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I. INTRODUCTION
Vernonia School District 47JY. Acton' presented the United States Supreme
Court with the issue of whether the Student Athlete Drug Policy (the "Policy")
adopted by School District 47J (the "District") in Vernonia, Oregon mandating
random urinalysis drug testing for all students participating in school-sponsored
athletics violates the Fourth2 and Fourteenth3 Amendments to the United States
Constitution. The Court held that the District's Policy was reasonable and,
therefore, constitutional.4
Twelve-year-old James Acton was not an accused drug user.5 However, he
was not allowed to play football on his school's team because he refused to
submit a urine sample for drug testing purposes.6 James was in the seventh
grade at Washington Grade School when his school implemented the drug testing
policy. He wanted to play football for his school, but James and his parents
refused to sign the consent form authorizing the school to perform drug testing.
The Actons explained to the school principal that they objected to the testing
because there was no evidence James was using drugs. The principal agreed that
James was not suspected of using drugs and explained that every member of the
team had to be tested even if they were not suspected drug users.7
After this meeting the Actons filed suit seeking declaratory and injunctive
relief from enforcement of the school district's Policy. The Actons alleged the
Policy violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States
Constitution and Article I, section 9 of the Oregon Constitution."
Copyright 1996, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
1. 115 S. Ct 2386 (1995).
2. The Fourth Amendment states in relevant part "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated." U.S. Const. amend. IV.
3. The Fourteenth Amendment states in relevant part:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities
of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.
U.S. Const. amend. XV, § 1.
4. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2396.
5. Acton v. Vernonia School Dist. 47J, 796 F. Supp. 1354, 1363 (D. Or. 1992).
6. Id. at 1359.
7. Id.
8. Or. Const. art. 1, § 9 provides:
No law shall violate the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable search, or seizure; and no warrant shall issue but upon
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The district court balanced James's legitimate expectations of privacy against
the "district's need to maintain order and protect its students from injury by use
of the least intrusive means available to it." The district court made four
important findings of fact: (1) drugs were prevalent in Vernonia School District
47J; (2) school athletes were using drugs and playing sports unsafely during their
use; (3) athletes were role models in the small, rural community; and (4) athletes
were bragging about drug use to others.'0 The district court also found that the
school district proved its drug testing program served a "compelling need," a
requirement the court read previous Supreme Court cases to include. Therefore,
the district court found the drug testing program constitutional. The Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, finding that the balance weighed in favor of
James's privacy interests. The Ninth Circuit, also reading the prior United States
Supreme Court cases to require a compelling government need, found no such
need present." The United States Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit's
ruling.'
probable cause, supported by oath, or affumation, and particularly describing the place to
be searched, and the person or thing to be seized.
An analysis of the Policy in terms of the Oregon Constitution is beyond the scope of this note. The
Supreme Court spoke on this issue only in remanding the case stating:
The Ninth Circuit held that Vemonia's Policy not only violated the Fourth Amendment
but also, by reason of that violation, contravened Article I, § 9 of the Oregon Constitution.
Our conclusion is that the former holding rested on a flawed premise. We therefore
vacate the judgment, and remand the case to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
Vernonia School Dist. 47J v. Acton, 115 S. Ct. 2386, 2397 (1995).
On remand, the Ninth Circuit denied a request to certify to the Oregon Supreme Court the question
of whether Vernonia's drug testing policy should be struck down under the Oregon Constitution and
stated that "[p]ursuant to the United States Supreme Court's decision in Vernonia School District v.
Acton and because we are of the opinion that the Oregon Supreme Court would not offer greater
protection under the provisions of the Oregon Constitution in this case, we affirm the judgment of
the district court." Acton v. Vemonia School Dist. 47J, 66 F.3d 217 (9th Cir. 1995) (citations
omitted). Thus, the Policy will be implemented in Vernonia's public schools.
The one dissenting judge who would grant the motion to certify stated:
I am not prepared to say that the Oregon Supreme Court will decide that the rights of its
school children must be shaped by the national frenzy over the war-on-drugs. To the
contrary, given its history of rugged individualism and its concern for constitutional rights,
Oregon might well opt for a more generous and enlightened reading of its constitution.
Acton v. Vemonia School Dist. 47J, 66 F.3d 217, 220 (9th Cir. 1995) (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
9. Acton v. Vernonia School Dist. 47J, 796 F. Supp. 1354, 1364 (D. Or. 1992).
10. Id. at 1363.
11. Acton v. Vernonia School Dist. 47J, 23 F.3d 1514, 1526 (9th Cir. 1994).
12. Vernonia School Dist. 47J v. Acton, 115 S. Ct. 2386 (1995). In so holding, Justice Scalia
wrote for the majority with Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Kennedy, Thomas, Ginsburg, and
Breyer joining. Justice Ginsburg filed a concurring opinion. Justice O'Connor dissented with
Justices Stevens and Souter joining.
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A. Background Facts of Acton
Vernonia, Oregon is a small logging town that offers few entertainment
choices.1 3 School sports play an important part of daily life and school athletes
are respected and admired. 4 Before the early 1980s, there were no real
discipline problems at Vemonia schools. However, in the mid-to-late 1980s, the
staff "began noticing a startling and progressive increase in students' use of
drugs and alcohol."' 5 The teachers were asked to watch for signs of drug or
alcohol abuse to help the administration judge the extent of the problem. As
time went on, the "glamorization"16 and drug and alcohol use became more
obvious. Students bragged about drug use and disrupted the classroom. The
situation was intolerable. 7
Drug and alcohol use were also prevalent in the athletic program. Student
athletes drank alcohol on the bus after a game. A coach testified at trial that
students' use of drugs would slow down their reaction time and increase their
risk of injury."
The administration conducted an investigation and found that the leaders of
the school's drug culture were the leading student athletes. To combat the
problem, the school implemented educational programs, special classes, special
speakers, seminars and theatrical presentations to highlight the evils of drug use.
A drug dog was also brought into the school. However, all of these tactics failed
to impact the drug problem. Finally, hoping to end the drug problems, the
administration approved a drug testing program for athletes. 9
13. The district court reported that Vernonia has a population of only 3000 persons, including
those living near the city limits. There are few entertainment opportunities in Vernonia and athletics
are important to all citizens of the small logging community. Acton v. Vernonia School Dist. 47J,
796 F. Supp. 1354, 1356 (D. Or. 1992).
14. Id. This ardent interest in school athletics provides athletes with a high profile in the town.
Consequently, 60-65% of all high school students participate in athletics and 75% of all elementary
school students participate in district-sponsored athletics. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. The term "glamorization" means bragging about or glorifying drug use. See United
States Supreme Court Official Transcript of Vemonia School Dist. 47J v. Acton Oral Argument No.
94-590, 1995 WL 353412, *3-4 (March 28, 1995).
17. The district court characterized the grave situation by stating:
Outbursts of profane language during class, rude and obscene statements directed at other
students, and a general flagrant attitude that there was nothing the school could do about
their conduct or their use of drugs or alcohol typified a usual day. Organizations formed
within the student drug culture taking such names as the "Big Elks" or the "Drug Cartel."
Loud "bugling" or "head butting" were the calling cards of these groups. Drug
paraphernalia was confiscated on school grounds, and open use of drugs was observed at
a local cafe across the street from the high school.
Acton v. Vernonia School Dist. 47J, 796 F. Supp. 1354, 1356-57 (D. Or. 1992).
18. Id. at 1357.
19. Id. at 1358.
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B. Vernonia School District's Drug Testing Policy
The drug testing policy instituted by the school district requires that all
students who participate in school sports, along with their parents, sign consent
forms allowing the District to perform drug tests on samples of urine provided
by each student-athlete.2" The tests are 99.94% accurate and screen for
amphetamines, cocaine, marijuana and LSD.2
Each athlete is tested at the beginning of each athletic season in which he
participates. Subsequently, students are subjected to random weekly testing.
After the students are randomly selected for testing, they are notified and taken
for testing by monitors. A male monitor accompanies the boy into the locker
room. The student must produce a urine sample in an open urinal. However,
he remains fully clothed and keeps his back to the monitor, who remains twelve
to fifteen feet behind the student.' The procedure is essentially the same for
female athletes, except they produce their samples in an enclosed stall with a
toilet. A female monitor remains outside the stall and listens for normal sounds
of urination.'
After the sample is handed to the monitor, it is checked for temperature and
signs of tampering. If everything seems to be in order, the vial, identified only
by a specimen control number randomly assigned to the student before the test
was performed, is sealed and sent to a lab for testing. If a test is positive, a
second test is performed to confirm the results. If the second test is negative, no
further steps are taken.24 Parents of the student are informed of the results only
if the second test is positive. If the second test is positive, a hearing is held with
the student and his parents. At the hearing, the student may choose to either
participate in a drug assistance program and be tested weekly for drugs, or he
may choose to be suspended from the athletic program for the current season and
the next athletic season.2s No criminal action is instituted by the school against
a student who tests positive for drug use.
20. The General Authorization Form reads in pertinent part:
I... authorize the Vernonia School District to conduct a test on a urine specimen which
I provide to test for drugs and/or alcohol use. I also authorize the release of information
concerning the results of such a test to the Vemonia School District and to the parents
and/or guardians of the student.
Vernonia School Dist. 47J v. Acton, 115 S. CL 2386, 2394 (1995).
21. Acton v. Vernonia School Dist. 47J, 23 F.3d 1514, 1517 (9th Cir. 1994).
22. Acton v. Vernonia School District 47J, 796 F. Supp. 1354, 1358 (D. Or. 1992).
23. Id. -
24. Id. at 1358-59.
25. Id. at 1359. For a second offense, a student is suspended from participating in athletics for
the current season and the next season, with no option to enroll in the counseling program. For a
third offense, the student is suspended for the current season and the next two athletic seasons, also
without opportunity to reduce the penalty and enroll in the drug assistance program. Acton v.
Vernonia School Dist. 47J, 23 F.3d 1514, 1517 (9th Cir. 1994).
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II. THE LAW PRIOR TO THE ACTON DECISION
A. The Supreme Court Cases
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution controls all searches
and seizures conducted by government agents. The primary purpose of the Fourth
Amendment "is to impose a standard of 'reasonableness' upon the exercise of
discretion by government officials ... in order 'to safeguard the privacy and
security of individuals against arbitrary invasions. ' '' 6 The Supreme Court
interprets the Fourth Amendment to require a warrant for all searches and
seizures. Recognizing that the warrant requirement is only a "judicial gloss on
the Amendment,"28 the Supreme Court established exceptions to this general rule.
Included within these exceptions are investigatory detentions, warrantless arrests,
searches incident to valid arrests, seizures of items in plain view, exigent
circumstances, consent searches, searches of containers, inventory searches, border
searches, searches at sea, administrative searches, and searches in which the special
needs of law enforcement make the probable cause requirement impracticable."
The Court also allows a warrantless search or seizure if probable cause is shown."
The exceptions relevant to the discussion of the law prior to the Acton decision are
investigatory detentions and searches where the s'pecial needs of law enforcement
make the probable cause requirement impracticable.
1. Investigatory Detentions
The exception of investigatory detentions reduces the probable cause
requirement to a requirement of reasonable suspicion. In Terry v. Ohio," the
26. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653-54, 99 S. Ct. 1391, 1396 (1979) (quoting Marshall
v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 312, 98 S. Ct. 1816, 1820 (1978)). See also United States v.
Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 554, 96 S. Ct. 3074, 3081 (1976); Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S.
433, 439, 93 S. Ct. 2523, 2527 (1973); Terry v . Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20-21, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1879
(1968); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528, 87 S. Ct. 1727, 1730 (1967). See generally
Paul P. Bolus, Comment, Random Drug Testing in the Government Sector: A Violation of Fourth
Amendment Rights?, 62 Tul. L. Rev. 1373, 1377-80 (1988).
27. Louis G. Alonso, Jr., Project, Twenty-Fourth Annual Review of Criminal Procedure: United
States Supreme Court and Courts of Appeals 1993-1994, 83 Geo. L.J. 665 (1995).
28. Id.
29. Greg Knopp, et al., Project, Twenty-Fourth Annual Review of Criminal Procedure: United
States Supreme Court and Courts of Appeals 1993-1994, 83 Geo. L.J. 692 (1995). This article
contains a detailed discussion of each of these exceptions and the jurisprudence that established each
of them.
30. See Alonso, supra note 27, at 665. This article states that the Fourth Amendment consists
of two separate clauses. The first of these clauses is "a prohibition against unreasonable searches and
seizures," and the second is "a requirement that warrants be supported by probable cause." Id at
665. As the author explains, the Fourth Amendment does not literally call for warrants or probable
cause, but the Supreme Court has nevertheless imposed these requirements in the context of searches
and seizures. Id. In support of these propositions, the author cites Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347, 88 S. Ct. 507 (1967) and Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 45 S. Ct. 280 (1925).
31. 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868 (1968).
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Court utilized a balancing test to determine the reasonableness of an officer's
frisk of a person the officer suspected was about to commit an armed robbery.
The Terry Court reduced the required level of suspicion from probable cause to
reasonable suspicion to uphold the constitutionality of stop and frisks."
Though the Court stated that this individualized suspicion was necessary and
must be specific, 33 this core requirement of reasonableness was "substantially
eroded" by subsequent cases. 4
Camara v. Municipal CourP" is the first case that allowed a'departure from
individualized suspicion.36 The Camara Court allowed search warrants to
inspect for housing code violations to be issued on an area-wide basis. The
Court did not require there to be a suspicion that a particular establishment was
in violation of the code. In deciding that area-wide warrants could be issued, the
Court balanced the government's need to search against the severity of the
invasion." Camara is important because it is "the fountainhead of many of the
factors relied on by the Court to justify departures from individualized suspicion
in later cases."3
Delaware v. Prouse 9 decided twelve years after Camara, required the
Court to decide whether it was constitutional under the Fourth Amendment to
stop an automobile to check the license of the driver and the registration of the
car where neither probable cause nor reasonable suspicion that laws were being
broken or about to be broken existed. The Court set' out a four-pronged
balancing test to determine if such a suspicionless, random search is reasonable.
The four prongs are: (1) the nature of the government's interest; (2) the
"physical and psychological intrusion"' 4 on the individual; (3) the level of
discretion the government has in conducting the search; and (4) the necessity of
the intrusion to produce the results (i.e., whether there are any equally effective
but less intrusive alternatives). 4' Thus, the balancing test used in Camara is
given more substance in Prouse.
32. Id. at 20, 88 S. Ct. at 1879. See also Thomas K. Clancy, The Role of Individualized
Suspicion in Assessing the Reasonableness of Searches and Seizures, 25 U. Mem. L. Rev. 483 (1995)
(explaining that this level of suspicion was accepted because stop and frisks are less intrusive than
arrests and searches).
33. Terry, 392 U.S. at 21, 88 S. Ct. at 1879-80.
34. Clancy, supra note 32, at 546.
35. 387 U.S. 523, 87 S. Ct. 1727 (1967).
36. Clancy, supra note 32, at 547. See also Knopp, supra note 29, at 758-61 and Robert C.
Farley, Jr., Recent Decision, 68 Temp. L. Rev. 439, 443 (1995).
37. Camara, 387 U.S. at 534, 87 S. Ct. at 1735.
38. Clancy, supra note 32, at 548. These factors and subsequent cases are important to the
development of the law leading up to the Acton decision, but are beyond the scope of this note. For
a thorough history of the development of these specific exceptions, see id. at 549-84.
39. 440 U.S. 648, 99 S. Ct. 1391 (1979).
40. Id. at 657, 99 S. Ct. at 1398.
41. Id. at 655-61, 99 S. Ct. at 1397-1400. See also Farley, supra note 36, at 443-44. It should
be noted that the factors were not listed in the majority opinion. They were simply the issues the
(Vol. 56
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2. Special Needs of Law Enforcement
A warrant is not required "in those exceptional circumstances in which
special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant
and probable-cause requirement impracticable."'42 This "special need" exception
to the, warrant requirement is utilized when authorities require greater flexibility
to adequately and promptly respond to unique situations."3 In these "special
needs" cases, "the Court evaluates the extent to which the requirements interfere
with the unique government interests at stake and then balances these interests
against the degree of intrusion upon individual privacy." 4
4
In New Jersey v. T.L.O.,4 the Court applied the balancing test begun in
Camara and further developed in Prouse to the search of a high school student.
In T.L.O., a teacher caught two high school girls smoking cigarettes in violation
of school rules. She took the girls to the principal's office whereupon one girl,
identified as T.L.O. by the Court, denied she had been smoking. The principal
then searched T.L.O.'s purse and found a pack of cigarettes, rolling papers,
marijuana, and letters indicating that T.L.O. was involved in marijuana dealing.
Consequently, the police were notified and the State brought charges against
T.L.O.46
The Court first held that the Fourth Amendment restrictions applied to public
school officials because they act as representatives of the State and not merely
as substitutes for the parents.47 Then the Justices determined that the search of
T.L.O.'s purse was constitutional. The Court began by noting that the "school
Court looked at in determining whether the search at issue was constitutional. The Court balanced
the intrusion of the government's practice on the individual's Fourth Amendment interest against the
promotion of the legitimate governmental concerns and, using its newly formed factors, concluded
that the search was unconstitutional. Prouse, 440 U.S. at 663, 99 S. Ct. at 1401. Using the language
of the Court, the specific holding of Prouse is:
(Elxcept in those situations in which there is at least articulable and reasonable suspicion
that a motorist is unlicensed or that an automobile is not registered, or that either the
vehicle or an occupant is otherwise subject to seizure for violation of law, stopping an
automobile and detaining the driver in order to check his driver's license and the
registration of the automobile are unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.
Prouse, 440 U.S. at 663, 99 S. Ct. at 1401 (emphasis added).
42. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351, 105 S. Ct. 733, 748 (1985) (Blackmun, J.,
concurring).
43. Id.
44. Knopp, supra note 29, at 763.
45. 469 U.S. 325, 105 S. Ct. 733 (1985).
46. Id. at 328-29, 105 S. Ct. at 735-36.
47. Id. at 336-37, 105 S. Ct. at 740. The Court reached this conclusion by stating:
We have held school officials subject to the commands of the First Amendment and the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. If school authorities are state actors
for purposes of the constitutional guarantees of freedom of expression and due process it
is difficult to understand why they should be deemed to be exercising parental rather than
public authority when conducting searches of their students.
Id. at 336, 105 S. Ct. at 740 (citations omitted).
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setting requires some easing of the restrictions to which searches by public
authorities are ordinarily subject."'8 The majority stated that this easing was
needed because the warrant requirement was particularly unsuited to the school
environment. 9 To demand that a warrant be obtained prior to any search
would "unduly interfere with the maintenance of the swift and informal
disciplinary procedures needed in the schools. ' '" Thus, the Court held that
school officials are not required to obtain a search warrant before conducting a
search of a student under that school official's authority.5"
Next, the Court reasoned that "probable cause is not an irreducible
requirement of a valid search."52 The core requirement, the Court noted, is
reasonableness. 3 The determination of whether or not the search is reasonable
requires a balancing of governmental and private interests while looking at all
the circumstances involved. The T.L.O. Court set out a two-prong test to
determine reasonableness: (1) "whether the ... action was justified at its
inception,"' and (2) "whether the search as actually conducted 'was reasonably
related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first
place."'' 5 It is significant that the Court noted:
We do not decide whether individualized suspicion is an essential
element of the reasonableness standard we adopt for searches by school
authorities. In other contexts, however, we have held that although
"some quantum of individualized suspicion is usually a prerequisite to
a constitutional search or seizure[,] ... the Fourth Amendment imposes
no irreducible requirement of such suspicion." '56
This issue of individualized suspicion was not present because the principal had
reasonable individualized suspicion to search T.L.O.'s purse.
T.L.O. is best known as a special needs case even though the majority did
not classify it as such." Justice Blackmun, in concurrence, pointed out that the
majority omitted this "crucial step" from their analysis." Other special needs
48. Id. at 340, 105 S. Ct. at 742.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 341, 105 S. Ct. at 742-43 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20, 88 S. Ct. 1868,
1897 (1968)).
55. Id.
56. Id. at 342 n.8, 105 S. Ct. at 743 n.8 (quoting United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S.
543, 560-61, 96 S. Ct. 3074, 3084 (1976)).
57. See Clancy, supra note 32, at 572 n.421. Cases after T.L.O., however, have recognized
T.L.O. as a "special needs" case. See, e.g., Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S.
602, 109 S. Ct. 1402 (1989).
58. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351, 105 S. Ct. 733, 747 (1985) (Blackmun, J.,
concurring).
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exist in the context of searches of a probationer's home,59 a public employee's
office,' a railway employee's blood and urine after a major train accident,61
and a Customs Service employee's urine after he applied for a transfer or
promotion to certain positions. 2
In Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass 'n63 the Supreme Court held
a suspicionless urinalysis constituted a search by the government and was subject
to Fourth Amendment limitations. Thus, to be constitutional, the search must be
reasonable considering all the circumstances surrounding it." This reasonable-
ness, the Court said, is "'judged by balancing [the intrusion of the government's
practice] on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against its promotion
of legitimate governmental interests."' 65 The Court found that the government's
need to test railway employees after a train wreck to ensure safety was
"compelling" and outweighed the intrusion on the individual's interests." Thus,
the search was constitutional.
National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab,6' decided the same day
as Skinner, involved the issue of whether the Fourth Amendment is violated
when the United States Customs Service requires a urinalysis test from
employees who request transfers or promotions to positions that involve
enforcing drug laws, carrying firearms or handling classified materials. In
beginning its analysis, the Court stated:
[O]ur decision in Railway Labor Executives reaffirms the longstanding
principle that neither a warrant nor probable cause, nor, indeed, any
measure of individualized suspicion, is an indispensable component of
reasonableness in every circumstance .... [W]here a Fourth Amend-
ment intrusion serves special governmental needs, beyond the normal
need for law enforcement, it is necessary to balance the individual's
privacy expectations against the Government's interests to determine
whether it is impractical to require a warrant or some level of individu-
alized suspicion in the particular context."
Thus, the Court concluded that conducting a balancing test was the proper
measure of reasonableness. As in Skinner, the Court found that the government's
59. Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 107 S. Ct. 3164 (1987).
60. O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 107 S. Ct. 1492 (1987).
61. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 109 S. Ct. 1402 (1989).
62. National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 109 S. Ct. 1384 (1989).
63. 489 U.S. 602, 109 S. Ct. 1402 (1989).
64. Id. at 619, 109 S. Ct. at 1414.
65. Id. (quoting Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654, 99 S. Ct. 1391, 1396 (1979)).
66. Id. at 628, 109 S. Ct. at 1419. Before Acton, this statement was read by scholars and courts
to require a compelling government need in order to justify a suspicionless search. See Farley, supra
note 36, at 447-48; Acton v. Vemonia School Dist. 47J, 796 F. Supp. 1354, 1363 (1992); Acton v.
Vemonia School Dist. 47J, 23 F.3d 1514, 1526 (1994).
67. 489 U.S. 656, 109 S. Ct. 1384 (1989).
68. Id. at 665-66, 109 S. Ct. at 1390-91.
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interest in securing public safety was "compelling""6 and outweighed the
individuals' privacy interests which were diminished because public safety was
implicated. The search, a urinalysis in the absence of reasonable suspicion, was
therefore deemed constitutional.
B. The Lower Court Cases
Prior to the United States Supreme Court's decision in Acton, the lower
courts were divided concerning the constitutionality of random drug tests. Of the
federal circuits that confronted the issue, the Third,70 Seventh,7 Eighth,' and
Tenth73 Circuits declared some form of random drug tests constitutional. The
Fifth74 and NinthS Circuits declared the random drug tests presented to them
unconstitutional.
1. Circuits Declaring Random Drug Tests Constitutional
In Shoemaker v. Handel,76 the first decision to permit random urinalysis
drug testing,77 the United States Third Circuit Court of Appeals held that the
regulations adopted by the New Jersey Racing Commission that allow the State
Racing Steward to conduct random breath and urine tests to detect alcohol and
drug use by any official, jockey, trainer or groom were constitutional. 7s The
plaintiffs urged that the regulations violated their Fourth Amendment rights.
They argued that the tests could not be performed absent individualized suspicion
that the particular person to be tested was under the influence of drugs or
69. Id. at 670, 109 S. Ct. at 1393. The following statement, taken from the Von Raab decision
contributed to the thought that the Constitution requires that the government have a compelling
interest in conducting a search not supported by individual suspicion: "Our precedents have settled
that, in certain limited circumstances, the Government's need to discover such latent or hidden
conditions, or to prevent their development, is sufficiently compelling to justify the intrusion on
privacy entailed by conducting such searches without any measure of individualized suspicion." Id.
at 668, 109 S. Ct. at 1392. See supra note 66.
70. Shoemaker v. Handel, 795 F.2d 1136 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 986, 107 S. Ct.
577 (1986).
71. Schaill v. Tippecanoe County School Corp., 864 F.2d 1309 (7th Cir. 1988).
72. McDonnel v. Hunter, 809 F.2d 1302 (8th Cir. 1987).
73. Lucero v. Gunter, 17 F.3d 1347 (10th Cir. 1994).
74. Brooks v. East Chambers Consolidated Independent School Dist., 730 F. Supp. 759 (S.D.
Tex. 1989), af'd, 930 F.2d 915 (5th Cir. 1991).
75. Acton v. Vernonia School Dist. 47J, 23 F.3d 1514 (9th Cir. 1994).
76. 795 F.2d 1136 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 986, 107 S. Ct. 577 (1986).
77. Bolus, supra note 26, at 1381.
78. Shoemaker, 795 F.2d at 1137. One challenged regulation requires officials, jockeys,
trainers, and grooms to submit to breathalyzer tests that detect the use of alcohol when the State
Steward orders them to. The second challenged regulation requires that every official, jockey, trainer,
and groom submit to a urine test that detects the use of any controlled dangerous substance.
Sanctions may be imposed for refusal to take a test and for positive results. Id. at 1138.
[Vol. 56
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alcohol.7 9 The Commission argued that while the tests are a warrantless search
and seizure, they are reasonable in the highly regulated racing industry.s'
The court began its analysis by determining whether a warrant was required
in this case. It stated:
In closely regulated industries, ... an exception to the warrant
requirement has been carved out for searches of premises pursuant to
an administrative inspection scheme. Although it is clear that the New
Jersey horse-racing industry is closely regulated, the question that arises
in this case is whether the administrative search exception extends to the
warrantless testing of persons engaged in the regulated activity."'
The court determined that the exception was extended and concluded that no
warrant was required as long as there was a strong state interest in conducting
the warrantless search and the individuals' privacy expectations were decreased
due to the heavy regulation of the industry. The court held that these require-
ments were met and no warrant was required.'
The next question the court faced was whether the random nature of the
regulations comported with Fourth Amendment requirements. The answer to this
question turned on a factor articulated in Delaware v. Prouse' 3-whether the
officer conducting the tests had discretion to decide who would be subjected to
the testing in any particular instance. Since the tests in the scheme before the
court were mandated administratively and the Steward had no discretion in
conducting the tests, the court determined the regulations were consistent with
the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution."
The Seventh Circuit case of Schaill v. Tippecanoe County School Corp.
involved facts basically identical to those found in Acton. The Schaill court held
79. Id. at 1137, 1141. The plaintiff jockeys conceded that if the racing officials were aware
of objective, specific facts that indicated drug or alcohol use by one of them, a "warrantless
production of a breath or urine sample could be demanded." Id. at 1141.
80. Id. The Commission also points out the individuals subject to the tests are voluntary
participants in the industry.
81. Id. at 1142 (citations omitted).
82. Id. The court was quick to point out that the "holding applies only to breathalyzer and
urine sampling of voluntary participants in a highly-regulated industry. Thus it should not be read
as dispositive of the distinct issue presented in testing of children subject to mandatory school
attendance laws or the testing of motor vehicle drivers." Id. at 1142 n.5. Consequently, were this
court faced with a situation similar to that in Acton, it is questionable whether it would have upheld
the random drug testing procedure.
83. 440 U.S. 648, 661, 99 S. Ct. 1391, 1400 (1979). This is the question the court had the
most trouble with since the United States Supreme Court in Prouse had held that random searches
violated the Fourth Amendment. The court escaped this problem by distinguishing Prouse on the
ground that in that case, the tests were made solely based on a field officer's discretion. However,
in Shoemaker, the tests were conducted according to a lottery system.
84. Shoemaker v. Handel, 795 F.2d 1136, 1143 (3d Cir. 1986).
85. 864 F.2d 1309 (7th Cir. 1988).
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that random urinalysis drug testing of public school athletes did not violate the
Fourth Amendment. 6
The court began by holding that random urine drug testing is a search
subject to the constraints of the Fourth Amendment. 87 Next, the court decided
that the school corporation's testing program needed only to meet a reasonable-
ness test to be valid."8 To determine the reasonableness of the testing policy,
the court conducted a balancing test, weighing the athletes' privacy interests
against the government's interests in conducting the tests. The students' privacy
expectations were reduced because the students were not visibly observed while
urinating and because drug testing of athletes at the professional and collegiate
levels was highly publicized.89 Also, school athletes are subject to other
regulations, such as minimum grade and residency requirements." Thus, the
court concluded that the important governmental interest in deterring drug use
outweighed the students' reduced expectation of privacy.9' Therefore, the
testing program was reasonable and constitutional.
92
In McDonell v. Hunter,93 the Eighth Circuit was faced with the issue of the
constitutionality of an Iowa Department of Corrections policy that subjects
correctional institution employees to random searches of their vehicles and
persons, including urinalysis tests. The employees filed a class action suit
claiming the policy violated the Fourth Amendment and their constitutional right
to privacy.
The court conducted a balancing test to determine whether the policy was
reasonable and consistent with Fourth Amendment requirements. The test
consisted of balancing the government's need for the search against the invasion
on an individual's rights.' After engaging in this test, the court held:
86. Id. at 1324.
87. Id. at 1313. This was a significant holding as Skinner and Von Raab, which explicitly held
that random urinalysis drug testing was a search, had not yet been decided.
88. Id. at 1315.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 1321. This court realized the far-reaching implications Schaill could have in the
Fourth Amendment context and accordingly attempted to limit its application by stating that since
sports are discernible from most other school-related activities, "[r]andom testing of athletes does not
necessarily imply random testing of band members or the chess team." Id at 1319. The court went
on to note: "Our decision today should not be read as endorsing urine testing of all students
attending a school." Id. at 1319 n.10.
93. 809 F.2d 1302 (8th Cir. 1987).
94. Id. at 1305. In conducting the balancing test, the court reasoned "[w]hile correction officers
retain certain expectations of privacy, it is clear that, based upon their place of employment, their
subjective expectations of privacy are diminished while they are within the confines of the prison."
Id. at 1306. On the governmental side of the scale, the court determined that the government's
interests in conducting the tests were important. The government's interests, according to the court,
were in "assuring that the activities of those employees who come into daily contact with inmates
are not inhibited by drugs or alcohol and are fully capable of performing their duties." Id In
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Because the institutional interest in prison security is a central one,
because urinalyses are not nearly so intrusive as body searches, and
because this limited intrusion into the guards' expectation of privacy is,
we believe, one which society will accept as reasonable, we ... hold
that urinalyses may be performed uniformly or by systematic random
selection of those employees who have regular contact with the
prisoners on a day-to-day basis in medium or maximum security
prisons. Selection must not be arbitrary or discriminatory."
The Tenth Circuit upheld the random drug testing of state prisoners. In
Lucero v. Gunter," the court conducted the balancing test and held that random
drug testing of prisoners is reasonable in light of the substantial state interest in
maintaining a drug-free prison system.
2. Circuits Declaring Random Drug Tests Unconstitutional
Like the Ninth Circuit's decision in Acton," the Fifth Circuit also declared
a random drug testing scheme unconstitutional. In Brooks v. East Chambers
Consolidated Independent School District," the Fifth Circuit, in an unpublished
opinion, affirmed the district court's decision declaring unconstitutional a random
urinalysis drug testing program for students who participate in extracurricular
activities. The district court determined that a Fourth Amendment analysis was
applicable and "call[ed] for the application of an objective reasonableness
standard to searches in the schools.'" The court relied on T.L.O. in reasoning
that under ordinary circumstances a search of a student must be based upon
individualized suspicion that the search will reveal wrongdoing by the stu-
dent.'00 Thus, the court reasoned that for the drug testing program to be
constitutional, it must have been induced by extraordinary circumstances.101
Even if extraordinary circumstances are present, the court said, "T.L.O. still
deciding this, the court cited Shoemaker v. Handel and stated: "We believe the state's interest in
safeguarding the security of its correctional institutions is at least as strong as its interest in
safeguarding the integrity of, and the public confidence in, the horse racing industry." Id. at 1308.
95. Id. at 1308 (citations omitted).
96. 17 F.3d 1347 (10th Cir. 1994).
97. The Ninth Circuit recognized that Schaill would dictate a different result, but stated that
the Schalli court minimized the privacy interests of the students. It also noted, incorrectly, that the
post.Schaill decisions of Skinner and Von Raab would require that the governmental interest be
compelling, something the Schaill court did not find. After attempting to justify not following the
Seventh Circuit's decision in Schaill, the Ninth Circuit stated unabashedly: "[I]n a nutshell, we
simply do not agree with the Seventh Circuit." Acton v. Vemonia School Dist. 47J, 23 F.3d 1514,
1527 (9th Cir. 1994). Apparently, the Supreme Court could have said the same thing about the Ninth
Circuit decision as it reversed that court's Acton judgment.
98. 730 F. Supp. 759 (S.D. Texas 1989), aff'd, 930 F.2d 915 (5th Cir. 1991).
99. Id. at 764.
100. Id.
101. Id.
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mandates that the students' Fourth Amendment rights may not be diluted any
more than is necessary to preserve order in the schools."'"
After stating this, the court then launched into an examination of the
government's justifications for the program. It concluded that the program was
not narrowly tailored to the goal of deterring drug use by the students.
Therefore, the program could not be reasonable and constitutional. Furthermore,
the court read Skinner and Von Raab as requiring the government's interest to
be compelling in order to uphold a suspicionless search and concluded that there
was no compelling interest present.
0 3
III. EFFECT OF ACTON ON PRIOR LAW
A. The Acton Decision
TheActon majority began the analysis of the case by stating that the Fourteenth
Amendment extends Fourth Amendment protection to searches and seizures by
state officers, including public school officials." Citing Skinner"5 and Von
Raab,"°a the Court went on to say that the collection and testing of urine by the
state was a search subject to Fourth Amendment limitations. 0 7
. After establishing the foregoing, the Court began the Fourth Amendment
analysis of Vernonia's Drug Policy. It began with the general principle: "[T]he
ultimate measure of the constitutionality of a governmental search is 'reasonable-
ness.""0 8 This is determined by balancing the intrusion of the search on the
individual's Fourth Amendment interests against the government's legitimate
interests." 9 This is the same general enunciation of the test that was employed
in Delaware v. Prousel" and Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives'Ass'n.",
The Court next explained that it was using this balancing test, and not
requiring a search warrant, because special needs were present which made the
warrant and probable cause requirement unworkable."' The warrant require-
102. Id.
103. Id. at 766. The court recognized that Schaill would compel a different result, but stated
that because of the subsequent Supreme Court decisions in Skinner and Von Raab, Schaill might be
decided differently today. Additionally, the court distinguished Schaill by Stating: "[T]he law of the
Seventh Circuit [which decided Schaill] is different from and less protective of student rights than
Fifth Circuit law." Id.
104. Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton, 115 S. Ct. 2386, 2390 (1995) (citing New Jersey
v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 336-37, 105 S. Ct. 733, 740 (1985)).
105. 489 U.S. 602, 617, 109 S. Ct. 1402, 1413 (1989).
106. 489 U.S. 656, 665, 109 S. Ct. 1384, 1390 (1989).
107. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2390.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. 440 U.S. 648, 99 S. Ct. 1391 (1979).
111. 489 U.S. 602, 109 S. Ct. 1402 (1989).
112. Acton. 115 S. Ct. at 2391.
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ment would restrict the freedom of teachers to quickly discipline students and
maintain order in the schools."' The Court pointed out that although TL.O.
was a special needs case based on individualized suspicion of wrongdoing, in
that case they "explicitly acknowledged... 'the Fourth Amendment imposes no
irreducible requirement of such suspicion.....
After explaining why the reasonableness test would be used, the Court began
the balancing test. It elucidated two factors to consider in assessing the impact
of the search upon the individual student's privacy expectations. The first factor
the Court considered is: "[T]he nature of the privacy interest upon which the.
search here at issue intrudes.""' This factor was also called the scope of the
student's expectation of privacy by the Court."' Under this factor, the Court
noted that the Fourth Amendment protects only those expectations of privacy that
society considers legitimate."7 The legitimacy of those expectations varies
with the context. Thus, while students do have privacy rights, they are also
children who are subjected to the control of the state while they are in
school."' 8
While T.L.O. rejected the idea that the school's power over its students is
the delegated power of the parents, the Acton Court "emphasized that the nature
of that power is custodial and tutelary, permitting a degree of supervision and
control that could not be exercised over free adults."".9 Public school students
routinely are required to undergo physical examinations and vaccinations."
With respect to medical procedures, the Court reaffirmed that "'students within
the school environment have a lesser expectation of privacy than members of the
population generally.""' '
113. Id.
114. Id. (quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O. 469 U.S. 325, 342 n.8, 105 S. Ct. 733, 743 n.8 (1985)).
115. Id.
116. Id. at 2393.
117. Id. at 2391.
118. Id. In making this point, the Court stated: "Central, in our view, to the present case is the
fact that the subjects of the Policy are (1) children, who (2) have been committed to the temporary
custody of the State as schoolmaster." Id. The Court reinforces this view by later stating that
"Fourth Amendment rights, no less than First and Fourteenth Amendment rights, are different in
public schools than elsewhere; the 'reasonableness' inquiry cannot disregard the schools' custodial
and tutelary responsibility for children." Id. at 2392.
119. Id. at 2392. The Court went on to say that although schools do not have a constitutional
duty to protect their students, in many contexts school officials are required to act in loco parentis.
They must act in this capacity because the have the "duty to 'inculcate the habits and manners of
civility."' Id. (quoting Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 684, 106 S. Ct. 3159,
3165 (1986)).
120. Id.
121. Id. (quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O. 469 U.S. 325, 348, 105 S. Ct. 733, 746 (1985) (Powell,
J., concurring)). This statement soundly rebutted the Ninth Circuit's statement in Acton that "[t]here
is simply no sufficient basis for saying that the privacy interests of students are much less robust than
the interests of people in general." Acton v. Vemonia School Dist. 47J, 23 F.3d 1514, 1525 (9th Cir.
1994).
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The Court went on to say that student athletes have even less legitimate
privacy expectations. On this point, the Court stated:
School sports are not for the bashful. They require "suiting up" before
each practice or event, and showering and changing afterwards. Public
school locker rooms, the usual sites for these activities, are not notable
for the privacy they afford. The locker rooms in Vernonia are typical:
no individual dressing rooms are provided; shower heads are lined up
along a wall, unseparated by any sort of partition or curtain; not even
all the toilet stalls have doors .... [T]here is "an element of 'commu-
nal undress' inherent in athletic participation."'"
Another reason athletes have a reduced expectation of privacy is because they
voluntarily participate in athletics and they know the degree of regulation is
higher for them than for students generally."
The second factor the Court considered is the character of the intrusion. The
Court noted that the degree of the intrusion depends on the "manner" in which
the urine production is monitored." The implementation of the Policy was
carefully examined by the Court." The Court concluded: "Under such
conditions, the privacy interests compromised by the process of obtaining the
urine sample are in our view negligible."'" 6
The Court then enunciated a factor to be used when evaluating the
government's interests in carrying out the drug testing policy. This factor was
phrased as "the nature and immediacy of the governmental concern at issue here,
and the efficacy of this means for meeting it.' 27 In addressing the nature of
the government's interests, the Court noted that the lower Acton courts read
Skinner and Von Raab to require a "compelling" government interest.'2
Although the government's interests in these two cases was characterized as
compelling, the Court stated:
It is a mistake, however, to think that the phrase "compelling state
interest," in the Fourth Amendment context, describes a fixed, minimum
quantum of governmental concern, so that one can dispose of a case by
answering in isolation the question: Is there a compelling state interest,
122. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2392-93 (quoting Schaill v. Tippecanoe County School Corp.. 864 F.2d
1309, 1318 (7th Cir. 1988)).
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 2393. Specifically, the Court noted that males, when producing the sample, remain
fully clothed and are observed only from behind by male monitors. Females produce the sample in
an enclosed bathroom stall with a female monitor listening outside. This lead the Court to conclude
"these conditions are nearly identical to those typically encountered in public restrooms, which men,
women, and especially school children use daily." Id.
127. Id. at 2394.
128. Id.
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here? Rather, the phrase describes an interest which appears important
enough to justify the particular search at hand, in light of other factors
which show the search to be relatively intrusive upon a genuine
expectation of privacy. 9
The Court then stated that whether or not that high degree of concern was
required, it was met in this case.
130
Turning to the immediacy of the government's concerns, the Court noted
that the drug problems at the District's schools, particularly acute among athletes,
were escalating. 13' The Court found that the immediate crisis in Vernonia was
of greater proportions than in Skinner and Von Raab where suspicionless drug
testing was upheld with even less of a showing that a drug problem existed
within the groups to be tested.
Finally, the Court explained that the drug testing policy at Vernonia was an
effective means for dealing with the drug problem. It stated: "It seems to us
self-evident that a drug problem largely fueled by the 'role model' effect of
athletes' drug use, and of particular danger to athletes, is effectively addressed
by making sure that athletes do not use drugs."'32 The majority recognized the
Actons' argument that less intrusive means were available, namely suspicion-
based testing. 3 However, the majority rejected this argument by stating that
"we have repeatedly refused to declare that only the 'least intrusive' search
practicable can be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.""' Thus, the
Court concluded that the government's interests were sufficient to justify the
drug testing procedures.
31
The Court summed up its findings in holding: "Taking into account all the
factors we have considered above-the decreased expectation of privacy, the
relative unobtrusiveness of the search, and the severity of the need met by the
search-we conclude Vemonia's Policy is reasonable and hence constitution-
al."' 36 Finally, the Court explained that the key to this case was that it was
done to further the government's responsibilities as guardian and tutor to the
schoolchildren in its care.'37 When this is the case, the relevant question is
whether this search would be undertaken by a reasonable guardian and tutor.
The Court concluded that, given the findings of need by the District Court, this
search would be undertaken by a reasonable guardian or tutor.'38
129. Id. at 2394-95.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132, Id. at 2395-96.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 2396 (citing Skinner, 489 U.S. 602, 629 n.9, 109 S. Ct 1402, 1420 n.9 (1989)).
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 2397.
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B. Ramifications of Acton
As Justice O'Connor's dissent points out, perhaps the most important
implication of Acton is that the possibility of using a suspicion-based regime for
drug testing is treated as if it were any "run-of-the-mill, less intrusive alterna-
tive-that is, an alternative that officials may bypass if the lesser intrusion, in
their reasonable estimation, is outweighed by policy concerns unrelated to
practicability." '139 The problem with this treatment is that mass, suspicionless
searches are generally considered unreasonable"4 and "history and precedent"
teach that individualized suspicion is required under the Fourth Amendment
unless a suspicion-based regime would be ineffective.' Thus, Acton could be
cited in future cases as authority for first conducting the reasonableness balancing
test on a suspicionless search scheme and later summarily dismissing a
suspicion-based alternative as difficult,' rather than justifying the suspicion-
less search only after a suspicion-based one has been shown to be unworkable.
Another effect of Acton is that it seems to blur the distinction between
"important" and "compelling" governmental interests in the Fourth Amendment
context. The Court seems to say that a compelling state interest is one that is
important enough to justify the intrusiveness of the search at issue.'43 Perhaps
now, for suspicionless searches, compelling will be the same as important. That
is, because compelling is defined in terms of importance, what was once two
distinct levels of scrutiny could now be merged into one level of scrutiny that is
not as strict as the old compelling level was thought to be. One thing is certain,
Skinner and Von Raab do not require there to be a finding of a compelling state
interest (i.e., a minimum level of governmental concern) before a suspicionless
search can be deemed reasonable and, therefore, constitutional.
In addition to the compelling interest discussion, the Court also added to the
governmental interest analysis by requiring the state's concern to be "immediate"
in order to find the search reasonable.'" In this case, the immediacy of the
crisis is of "greater proportions" than in Skinner and of "much greater propor-
tions" than in Von Raab.1
45
139. Id. at 2402 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
140. See generally Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 45 S. Ct. 280 (1925); Delaware v.
Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 99 S. Ct. 1391 (1979); Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 100 S. Ct. 338 (1979);
Michigan State Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 110 S. Ct. 2481 (1990).
141. Vernonia School Dist. 47J v. Acton, 115 S. Ct. 2386, 2402 (1995) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).
142. Id. at 2396 ("Respondents' [suspicion-based] alternative entails substantial difficulties-if
it is indeed practicable at all.").
143. Id. at 2394-95 (stating that a compelling state interest is one that "appears important enough
to justify the particular search at hand, in light of other factors which show the search to be relatively
intrusive upon a genuine expectation of privacy.").
144. Id. at 2394.
145. Id. at 2395.
(Vol. 56
NOTES
C. Questions Left Unanswered by Acton
The Acton decision left many questions unanswered. The most important
question is whether the holding will be read narrowly, applying to the specific
facts of the case, or whether the holding will be extended to the drug testing of
all student participants in extracurricular activities or even an entire student
population. The majority, perhaps anticipating this question, stated: "We caution
against the assumption that suspicionless drug testing will readily pass
constitutional muster in other contexts."' 4' This "answer" is vague. What other
contexts? Does this holding apply to other extracurricular activities? If so, does
it apply to other extracurricular activities that do not ordinarily require their
participants to undress in each other's presence? Does it apply to all public
school students? Is it necessary to find that the particular group of students to
be tested is known to use drugs? Or, can a court simply note that drugs are a
national problem?
The Court stated: "[t]he most significant element in this case is the first we
discussed: that the Policy was undertaken in furtherance of the government's
responsibilities, under a public school system, as guardian and tutor of children
entrusted to its care." '47 This limits the holding only marginally. It tells us
merely that the government cannot impose under Acton a suspicionless drug
testing scheme on, say, all residents of a notoriously drug-infested neighborhood.
It still does not answer whether or not participants of other school-sponsored
activities or their teachers, as guardians, may be subjected to random drug
testing.
If one were on the side against drug testing another segment of the school
population, it could be argued that Acton does not dictate a finding that the
policy is constitutional since, in Acton, the district court found specifically that
athletes were the leaders of the school's drug culture and role models for the
entire community. Additionally, the selection of athletes used in Acton was truly
random, not subject to the discretion of one school official and the procedure
was set up to maximize confidentiality and minimize the intrusion upon athletes'
privacy. On the other hand, someone arguing for the constitutionality of drug
testing another segment of the student body could point to the broad language
used by the majority indicating that students have a "lesser expectation of
privacy than members of the population generally," '" that "testing based on
'suspicion' of drug use would not be better, but worse,"'49 and that the key is
that the school was acting as tutor where the only limitation is that it act as a
"reasonable guardian and tutor."''
146. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2396.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 2392.
149. Id. at 2396.
150. Id. at 2397.
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Though this language appears in the Acton decision, it seems that the better
argument is for the narrower interpretation of the holding. This is because the
Court points to the specific findings made by the district court that athletes were
the leaders of the drug culture, were role models and were particularly
susceptible to physical injuries caused by drug use."' This conclusion is
further strengthened by the Court's statement that "given the findings of need
made by the District Court" the search was reasonable.12
A related issue to Acton is the question of whether school teachers may be
subjected to suspicionless drug testing. The most reasonable answer is that,
under Acton, they cannot."' The Acton decision is based on the fact that the
children being tested are under the tutorship of the school. Teachers are not
under this tutorship. Additionally, teachers, as members of the general
population, have a higher expectation of privacy than do students when they walk
through the school's front doors.
A harder question to answer is whether or not all students of a public school
may be randomly tested for drug use. Again, the most reasonable answer is that,
under Acton, in the most typical public school setting, they cannot. This is
because the type of findings in Acton and accepted by the United States Supreme
Court could hardly be made. It would be almost impossible for a court to find
that all students in a typical high school were role models for each other and the
entire community in which the school was operating. However, one can imagine
a public school in a small town that accepts for admission only the brightest
students in the state. If a trial court could find, as a fact, that many of these
students were openly using and glorifying drug use and that the school's
151. Id. at 2395-96.
152. Id. at 2397.
153. An analysis of these questions presented under La. Const. art. I, § 5 is beyond the scope
of this note. The answers proposed deal with Fourth Amendment principles under existing United
States Supreme Court caselaw. It is possible that Louisiana could give even more protection to
individual privacy in an Acton-type situation. See State v. Hernandez, 410 So. 2d 1381 (La. 1982),
in which Justice Dennis, writing for the majority, states:
Our state constitution's declaration of the right to privacy contains an affirmative
establishment of a right ofprivacy, explicit protections against unreasonable searches,
seizures or invasions of property and communications, as well as houses, papers and
effects, and gives standing to any person adversely affected by a violation of these
safeguards to raise the illegality in the courts. This constitutional declaration of right is
not a duplicate of the Fourth Amendment or merely coextensive with it; it is one of the
most conspicuous instances in which our citizens have chosen a higher standard of
individual liberty than that afforded by the jurisprudence interpreting the federal
constitution.
Hernandez, 410 So. 2d at 1385 (citations omitted). See also State v. Hutchinson, 349 So. 2d 1252,
1254 (La. 1977) (where the Court was "unwilling to hold that the rights safeguarded by Article I, §
5 of (the Louisiana Constitution] are merely coextensive with those protected by the Fourth
Amendment to the federal constitution.') and State v. Abram, 353 So. 2d 1019, 1022 n.1 (La. 1977)
(where the Louisiana Supreme Court noted again that Article I, § 5 of the Louisiana Constitution is
not merely coextensive with the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution).
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students, as a whole, were role models for the entire community, then perhaps
it would be constitutional to subject the entire student body to random drug
testing. However, this situation would be rare. The arguments might come
down to how heavily the Acton Court relied on the fact that athletes playing
sports while under the influence of drugs presented a danger to themselves and
other players.
One final question to be examined is whether students involved in other
extracurricular activities may be subjected to random drug testing. Under a
reasonable and narrow interpretation of Acton, this would depend on the findings
that could be made and the dangers posed to others by these students' drug use.
The court must determine whether the members of this activity or club are using
drugs, whether they are role models in the school and the whole community and
whether others are aware of their drug use. If a court can make all of these
findings of fact, then perhaps the balancing test used in Acton can be applied and
the search declared constitutional.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Acton decision is a novel decision as it is the first time that the United
States Supreme Court has addressed the issue of drug testing in the public
schools. Furthermore, it is only the second time the Court has addressed the
issue of Fourth Amendment rights of public schoolchildren.13 ' This time, it
seems, the Court has restricted those rights even more.
If Acton is read narrowly and literally, it seems to be a sound decision
backed by valid policy concerns. It sends a strong message to our nation's youth
and their parents-that drug use will not be tolerated. If, however, the language
of the decision is stretched and pulled to apply to situations not covered by the
facts of Acton, rights protected by the Fourth Amendment could be restricted in
a way the Supreme Court, and indeed in a way that our nation's founders, never
intended.
Courts must be cautious when examining the constitutionality of suspicion-
less searches and take care not to erode the rights all Americans hold dear.
Justice O'Connor's warning rings clear: "[T]he greatest threats to our constitu-
tional freedoms come in times of crisis."'15 We must not make hasty decisions
when restricting constitutional freedoms and, in so doing, create an even larger
crisis than the one discussed here.
Denise E. Jouber"
154. The first time this issue was discussed, of course, was in T.L.O.
155. Vemonia School Dist. 47J v. Acton, 115 S. Ct. 2386, 2407 (1995) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).
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